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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, in conflict with prior decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court, that a witness who presents negative whistle testimony (i.e., a witness 
who testifies that a train whistle was not sounded) need only be in a physical position to hear 
the whistle and not in a mental position to hear the whistle? By "mental position" Union 
Pacific refers to the Utah Supreme Court's requirement that a negative whistle witness must 
not be so engrossed in or diverted to other things that the witness would have heard a train 
whistle had it been sounded. 
2. Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, on an important question of law which 
has not yet but should be settled by the Utah Supreme Court, that a negative whistle witness 
does not need to lay a foundation showing that the witness was in a physical and mental 
position to have heard the train whistle had it been sounded? Encompassed within this 
question is the subsidiary question of whether Union Pacific presented evidence that Alecia 
Jensen was not in a mental position to hear a whistle as she was engrossed in other matters, 
and whether Jensen presented contrary evidence making this an issue of fact for the jury? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, on an important question of law which 
has not yet but should be settled by the Utah Supreme Court, that an affidavit filed in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment that is inconsistent with previously served 
interrogatory answers creates an issue of fact sufficient to preclude entry of summary 
judgment? Encompassed within this question is the subsidiary question of whether the Court 
of Appeals wrongly decided that Jensen's affidavit submitted in opposition to summary 
1 
judgment was not inconsistent with her interrogatory answers? 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment on two grounds and reversed 
on a third ground in Jensen v. Union Pacific Rfli1rQfKl, Case No. 950754-CA, Memorandum 
Decision, dated April 25, 1996. A copy of the decision is included as part of the Appendix. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals' Memorandum Decision which is sought to be reviewed is 
dated April 25, 1996. A motion for rehearing was denied by order dated May 17, 1996. A 
copy of the order denying rehearing is included as part of the Appendix. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1953 as amended). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS 
Because of the length of Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994 as amended), it has been 
reproduced and included as part of the Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition: 
Alecia Jensen originally sued Union Pacific for a claim arising from a train/auto 
accident which occurred in Springville, Utah where Jensen was thrown from her automobile 
upon impact with a Union Pacific locomotive. Union Pacific brought a Motion For Summary 
Judgment in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County (hereinafter "trial court"). 
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Summary Judgment was granted on May 15, 1995 in a Memorandum Decision with an Order 
Granting Summary Judgment dated June 9, 1995. A copy of the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order are included as part of the Appendix. An appeal was made by Jensen. 
The Utah Supreme Court assigned the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. That court affirmed 
the summary judgment on two grounds and reversed on a third ground in a Memorandum 
Decision dated April 25, 1996 (hereinafter "Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision"). On 
May 9,1996 defendant filed a Petition For Rehearing. The Court of Appeals entered its Order 
denying the Petition on May 17, 1996. 
Statement of Facts 
Jensen, age 17, was seriously injured when the automobile in which she was riding as 
a passenger drove in front of and was struck by a Union Pacific coal train. The accident 
occurred at approximately 12:10 p.m. on February 5, 1994, at a public railroad crossing of 
Union Pacific's Provo Subdivision mainline trackage located near 650 West and 5950 South 
in Spanish Fork. (Utah County Sheriffs Investigation File ("Sheriffs File"), R. 143-123). 
According to Jensen's Interrogatory Answers (No. 14), Jensen's car, a 1982 Honda 
Civic, had been purchased and was owned by Danny Jensen, Jensen's father, for Jensen's 
personal use. The car was being driven at the time of the accident by Jensen's boyfriend, 
Bruce Brinkmeier, also age 17. Brinkmeier was not licensed to drive an automobile, and 
received a citation for not being licensed following the accident. (Sheriffs File, R. 143-123). 
Union Pacific engineer Puffer was sounding the locomotive whistle and bell as the train 
approached the crossing. He began sounding the whistle and bell approximately 1/4 mile away 
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from the 5950 South crossing and continued to sound the whistle and bell from the 5950 South 
crossing on up to the point of the accident at 650 West. The distance between the 5950 South 
and 650 West crossings is approximately 1100 feet (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98; Sheriffs 
File, R. 143-123; Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106). 
The whistle and bell were operating properly and the whistle was a particularly loud 
whistle. The locomotive bell was also ringing. Engineer Puffer turned the bell on when he 
started sounding the whistle for the 5950 South crossing. He never turned the bell off until 
after the accident. Puffer operated the whistle and bell continuously from more than one 
quarter mile away up to the point of the accident. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98). 
Shortly after seeing a truck/horse trailer clear the crossing, Puffer noticed the Jensen 
car rolling towards the crossing. The car was following a few seconds behind the truck/horse 
trailer and moving past the stop sign. Puffer had the impression that the car never stopped for 
the stop sign. The car rolled onto the track directly in front of the train. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 
102-98; Sheriffs File, R. 143-123). 
According to Jensen's Interrogatory Answers (Nos. 15 and 35), Brinkmeier and Jensen 
had come from Brinkmeier's home in Salt Lake City, with Brinkmeier driving, to the place of 
the accident. The purpose of the drive was to visit Brinkmeier's foster parents who lived in the 
area and to see where Brinkmeier had worked just north of the crossing. 
Brinkmeier's deposition was never taken nor did he give an affidavit. However 
according to a recorded statement of Brinkmeier, a transcription of which was attached as an 
exhibit to Jensen's Memorandum in Opposition to Union Pacific's Motion (R. 178-158), 
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Brinkmeier and Jensen were playing a "wish" game upon arrival at the crossing. They did so 
by lifting their feet up off the floor of the car and touching something metallic with their 
fingers while at the same time making a wish and crossing the tracks. Jensen agrees that they 
may have been doing mat. (Brinkmeier Statement, R. 168-166; Affidavit of Alecia Jensen 
("Jensen Affidavit"), R. 181-180). 
Brinkmeier and Jensen never saw nor heard the train at any time before impact. They 
were playing the game and looking in a forward and/or upward direction to try and find a metal 
screw to touch as the car was at or near the stop sign. They did not look or listen for train 
traffic because of being preoccupied with playing the game. (Jensen Affidavit, R. 181-180; 
Sheriffs File, R. 143-123). 
In Jensen's Answer to Interrogatory No. 25, which specifically requested that she 
identify "any and all obstructions to your vision of the train's approach and railroad crossing," 
Jensen answered: "I do not recall if the view was obstructed." (R. 265). In her subsequent 
affidavit in response to Union Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment, Jensen recalled "that 
there were a lot of trucks and trailers which obstructed our view of the tracks in all directions." 
(Jensen Affidavit, R. 181). 
In Jensen's Answer to Interrogatory No. 26, responding to the question of how the 
accident happened, she stated: "I remember nothing of the accident and very little, if anything, 
of what happened prior to the accident." (R. 218). In her affidavit later submitted in 
opposition to Union Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment, Jensen stated that she did not 
recall playing the wish game, although she may have been, but did remember traffic congestion 
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at the crossing which obstructed the view of the tracks in all directions; and did recall never 
hearing or seeing the train. (Jensen Affidavit, R. 181-180); Court of Appeals Memorandum 
Decision at 4. This contradictory statement was Jensen's only evidence of noise and traffic 
congestion at the crossing and that the whistle was not sounded. 
Brinkmeier, in his recorded statement attached to Jensen's Memorandum in Opposition, 
stated that he was "not paying attention" at the crossing and "never heard anything." (R. 164). 
Independent witnesses Gerald and Whitney Hill and Johnny Starks were interviewed 
by the Utah County Sheriffs Office. They provided written statements to the Sheriffs Office 
but no depositions or affidavits were obtained in the lawsuit. The Hills made no reference to 
whether the whistle was or was not sounded-the subject was not addressed at all. However, 
Starks advised that, "I heard the train honking." (Sheriffs File, R. 139, 135, 134, 131). 
ARGUMENT 
Question No. 1. Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, in conflict with prior 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, that a witness who presents negative whistle 
testimony (i.e., a witness who testifies that a train whistle was not sounded) need only be 
in a physical position to hear the whistle and not in a mental position to hear the whistle? 
By "mental position" Union Pacific refers to the Utah Supreme Court's requirement that 
a negative whistle witness must not be so engrossed in or diverted to other things that the 
witness would have heard a train whistle had it been sounded. 
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of whether Union 
6 
Pacific complied with Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994), requiring the blowing of a whistle 
or ringing of a bell when approaching a railroad crossing, the Court of Appeals held that an 
issue of fact existed based on Jensen's negative whistle testimony; i.e., that she did not hear 
the whistle blow. The Court of Appeals held: 
It is not necessary for plaintiffs to establish that witnesses were 
affirmatively listening for the warnings or "paying particular 
attention to the thing observed [or not observed]." Seybold v. 
Union Pacific R.R.. 121 Utah 61, 66, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951). 
ff,All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in 
relation to the train at the time it is claimed the warnings were 
given that said warnings would have awakened her attention to 
them."' Curtis V. Haimon Ekes, Inc. 575 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah 
1978) (quoting Hudson v. Union Pacific R.R.. 120 Utah 245, 251, 
233 P.2d 357, 360 (1951)). 
Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision at 3. 
In so holding, the Court of Appeals misinterpreted this Court's test clearly enunciated 
in Curtis v. Harmon Elecs.r Inc., that although a negative whistle witness need not be 
specifically listening for a train whistle, as would someone approaching the track in a dense 
fog, the person must have a physical position sufficient to allow the person to hear a whistle 
if it was sounded and a mental position sufficient to allow the person to hear a whistle if it was 
sounded; i.e., the person must not be so engrossed in or diverted to other things that she would 
have heard a train whistle had it been sounded. Sfi£ Curtis. 575 P.2d at 1047 wherein this 
Court explained the mental position requirement repeatedly: 
On the other hand, where it appears the person whose 
negative testimony is offered was paying attention to another 
matter, such as another noisy passing train, his testimony is not of 
value. IdL citing Jensen v. Oregon Short Line, 59 Utah 367,204 
P. 101 (1922) (emphasis added). 
In Clark v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.. supra, this Court stated: 
Though a witness was not specially listening for 
signals, or giving special attention to the 
occurrence, yet, if his attention was not engrossed 
or diverted to other things, and it being made to 
appear that he was in [a] position to hear, and in all 
likelihood would have heard them had they been 
given, his testimony that he heard none is still of 
probative value, and is not to be disregarded,.... 
This Court affirmed that view in Hudson v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co.. in which we noted it was not necessary for the 
plaintiff to show the person was affirmatively listening for the 
whistle. We stated: 
All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in 
relation to the train at the time it is claimed the warnings were 
given that said warnings would have awakened her attention to 
them... [The witness] was in a position where it is likely that she 
would have heard the whistle, or at least the bell, and as there is 
no evidence that her attention was so absorbed in other matters 
that she would not have heard, a jury question is presented. 
Curtis. 575 P.2d at 1047. (Footnotes omitted, emphasis added.)1 
*See also. Hudson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.. 120 Utah 245, 233 P.2d 357, 360-61 
(1951). Although a plaintiff need not show that she was affirmatively listening or paying 
attention to determine whether the train was going to whistle or not, her mental position is 
important: 
All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in relation to the train 
at the time it is claimed the warnings were given that said warnings would 
have awakened her attention to them. The circumstances bearing on her 
opportunity and capacity to hear, such as possible deafness, pronounced wind 
direction affecting sounds, the speed and noise of the train and of the car, 
topography of the surrounding country, absorption in conversation or with her 
own thoughts or devices and any other factors which would enable the fact 
8 
Significantly, this is the position taken by Judge Greenwood of the panel of the Court 
of Appeals that decided this case. Judge Greenwood, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
would hold that plaintiff need show that she was paying sufficient attention to have heard the 
warnings if they were sounded. Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision at 5 citing the same 
cases cited by the majority for the opposing view. 
In restating the proposition that a person need not be specifically listening for a warning 
or paying particular attention to the thing observed, the Court of Appeals goes too far when 
it eliminates the requirement that a person still needs to be in a non-distracted mental position 
that would enable them to hear a whistle. There is a significant difference between the 
requirement that a person be affirmatively listening and the requirement that a person not be 
distracted or diverted so that she cannot hear. By failing to make this distinction, the Court 
of Appeals ruling significantly changes the test for negative whistle testimony which should 
finder to evaluate the probative force of her testimony should be considered. 
The convincing power of testimony that a sound was not heard varies 
according to the opportunity of the witness giving it to hear and observe, but 
a passenger in an automobile need not persistently keep his ear cocked for the 
sound of a train. In this case the plaintiff is necessarily confined to negative 
evidence in proving the fact that the whistle or bell was not sounded. If such 
evidence is unworthy of belief simply because it is negative, then a plaintiff 
in like circumstances must nearly always fail. The issue is fundamentally a 
question of the credibility of witnesses and considering the close proximity of 
the car to the train while they travelled parallel to each other, Mrs. Hudson 
was in a position where it is likely that she would have heard the whistle, or 
at least the bell, and as there is no evidence that her attention was so absorbed 
in other matters that she would not have heard a jury question is presented. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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be corrected by this Court. It is important for this Court to revisit the issue to prevent future 
misunderstandings of the test to be applied. ££., Bebout v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.. 982 
F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1993) (explicitly setting forth a two part test of physical position 
and mental position). 
Question No. 2. Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, on an important question 
of law which has not yet but should be settled by the Utah Supreme Court, that a negative 
whistle witness does not need to lay a foundation showing that the witness was in a 
physical and mental position to have heard the train whistle had it been sounded? 
Encompassed within this question is the subsidiary question of whether Union Pacific 
presented evidence that Alecia Jensen was not in a mental position to hear a whistle as she 
was engrossed in other matters, and whether Jensen presented contrary evidence making 
this an issue of fact for the jury? 
If this Court should correct the Court of Appeals' departure from its negative whistle 
testimony standard, the issue arises as to whether the negative whistle witness has the burden 
to lay a foundation showing that she was in a physical and mental position to have heard the 
train whistle had it been sounded. 
The Court of Appeals held: 
Union Pacific also claims Jensen's affidavit did not include 
statements that she was paying sufficient attention to have heard 
the whistle had it been sounded. Despite the dissent's acceptance 
of this argument, we can find no Utah law requiring nonmoving 
parties to lay such an evidentiary foundation in an affidavit 
opposing summary judgment. Nonmoving parties need only 
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controvert the moving party's assertions, thus creating a genuine 
issue of fact. 
Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision at 4. 
Contrary to the Court of Appeals assertion, nonmoving parties are required to lay an 
evidentiaiy foundation in affidavits opposing summary judgment. Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, requires that supporting and opposing affidavits "shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." (Emphasis 
added.) For Jensen to meet this requirement she must show, through laying of a proper 
foundation for her conclusion that she heard no whistle and therefore no whistle was blown, 
and that she is competent to testify to that matter because she was in a physical and a mental 
position to hear. Otherwise, a plaintiff could oppose a summary judgment with numerous 
affidavits saying no whistle was blown even though at trial it turns out that the witnesses were 
miles away, involved in a noisy environment, or engaged in something which completely 
occupied their attention like talking on a cellular phone. Each person could truthfully say, ,fI 
heard no whistle," but this would be meaningless without a foundation showing they could 
have heard a whistle had it been blown. 
This Court has stated that affiants must assert specific facts not mere assertions or 
conclusions. Sfi£, £ * , Butterfield v. Qkubo. 831 P.2d 97, 102-103 (Utah 1992) ("Utah has 
long required nonexpert rule 56 affiants to enumerate the specific evidentiary facts in support 
of their conclusions In recent years, we have made clear that this standard also applies to 
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a situation in which the affiant testifies as an expert."); Webster v. SilL 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 
(Utah 1983) (in response to a motion for summary judgment the mere assertion that an issue 
of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient 
to preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion). Requiring Jensen to set forth an 
evidentiary foundation for her negative whistle testimony is a logical extension of this rule.2 
It is important for the Supreme Court to make this extension. The Court of Appeals 
sanctions the opposing of a proper summary judgment motion with a mere conclusion. Such 
a lessening of the requirement in opposing summary judgments will have an effect far beyond 
this case. If a proper foundation for a conclusion does not exist there is no sense in prolonging 
the litigation, forcing the parties and the trial court to spend more time and money when the 
case could be resolved summarily. 
Encompassed within this question is the subsidiary questions of whether Union Pacific 
presented evidence that Jensen was not in a mental position to hear a whistle as she was 
engrossed in other matters, and whether Jensen presented contrary evidence making this an 
issue of fact for the jury. 
Given the fact that the Court of Appeals rejected the proposition that a foundation must 
2This topic has been discussed but not explicitly ruled on. £fi£ Broadwater v. Old 
Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 533-34 (Utah 1993), discussing objections to affidavits 
submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment because, in part, the affidavits 
contained facts not supported by an adequate foundation. The court apparently gave 
credence to the argument although no holding was made regarding the necessity of a 
foundation or affidavit in support. See also. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership. 899 
P.2d 977, 980-81 (Idaho 1995), allowing affidavits containing a proper foundation and 
rejecting affidavits that were in part, unsupported by any factual basis or foundation. 
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be laid without determining if a proper foundation was laid, should this Court decide that an 
evidentiary foundation must be laid it should reexamine the question of whether a proper 
foundation was laid by Jensen. This reexamination would promote judicial economy as the 
question can be answered based on the record before this Court. 
Union Pacific presented evidence before the trial court and referred to that evidence 
before the Court of Appeals that Jensen was distracted and involved in playing a "wish" game 
which diverted her attention from the oncoming train. See statement of facts, supra. Jensen 
confirmed in her affidavit that she may have been playing this game although she did not 
specifically remember. LsL On the other hand, Jensen said nothing in her affidavit showing 
that she was sufficiently alert so that she would have heard the train whistle had it been blown. 
Even under the Court of Appeals1 relaxed standard, Jensen's affidavit is not sufficient as she 
said nothing to contradict the fact that she was so engrossed in the "wish" game that had a 
whistle been blown it would have awakened her attention to it. She merely said that she heard 
no whistle. 
Judge Greenwood of the Court of Appeals found that no proper foundation existed. In 
dissent, Judge Greenwood stated: "In my view, plaintiff did not adequately rebut defendant's 
evidence that such warnings were sounded Plaintiffs affidavit that she did not hear any 
warnings, and may have been playing a "wish" game at the time of the collision, is bereft of 
assertions she was paying sufficient attention to have heard the warnings if they were sounded. 
Consequently, I would affirm the trial court's decision in its entirety." Court of Appeals 
Memorandum Decision at 5-6 (emphasis in original). Given the record and the dissent's 
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findings on the issue not examined by the majority, it would be proper to reinstate the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment. 
Question No. 3. Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, on an important question 
of law which has not yet but should be settled by the Utah Supreme Court, that an 
affidavit filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment that is inconsistent with 
previously served interrogatory answers creates an issue of fact sufficient to preclude 
entry of summary judgment? Encompassed within this question is the subsidiary question 
of whether the Court of Appeals wrongly decided that Jensen's affidavit submitted in 
opposition to summary judgment was not inconsistent with her interrogatory answers? 
The Court of Appeals held that Jensen's affidavit, submitted in opposition to Union 
Pacific's Motion For Summary Judgment, did not contradict her prior sworn interrogatory 
answers because Union Pacific did not specifically ask whether Jensen heard the whistle. 
Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision at 4. In a footnote, the court made a questionable 
ruling regarding whether a party opposing summary judgment can contradict prior testimony. 
The court ruled that answers to interrogatories, like affidavits, are sworn statements made 
without cross examination and that one sworn statement is not more probative than another 
merely because it was made first. Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision at 4 n.2. This 
implies that interrogatory answers can be contradicted with impunity any time a motion for 
summary judgment is brought. 
The Court of Appeals' ruling is in conflict with established Supreme Court precedent 
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insofar as it allows prior testimony to be contradicted. To the extent that this Court has not 
ruled specifically on the issue of prior interrogatory answers being contradicted by a 
subsequent affidavit, this Court should lay the matter to rest consistent with its rulings that 
prior deposition answers may not be contradicted by a subsequent affidavit 
It is well established in Utah that when a party takes a clear position in a deposition he 
may not thereafter raise an issue of fact defeating a motion for summary judgment by filing 
an affidavit which contradicts his deposition unless he can provide an explanation of the 
discrepancy. See, &&, Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983); Gawv.Stateof 
Utah 798 P.2d 1130, 1140 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The reason for such a rule is not that 
depositions are more reliable due to the opportunity to cross examine. In a motion for 
summary judgment, deposition testimony receives no more weight than an affidavit. See 
Webster. 675 P.2d at 1172. The proper reason is that a contrary rule would undermine the 
utility of summary judgment as a means for screening out sham issues of fact. LL at 1173. 
Otherwise, a party who goes through discovery, establishes the facts of a case and then moves 
for summary judgment will find that the opponent can change the facts by submitting an 
affidavit contradicting any admissions previously made. In effect, the opponent creates a sham 
issue of fact-which version of his testimony should be believed. See generally. Mays v. Ciba-
GeigyCorp.. 661 P.2d 348, 351-355 (Kan. 1983). 
Although this rule has not been specifically applied to affidavits contradicting 
interrogatory answers in Utah, the reasoning still applies and should be extended as it has been 
by other courts. See, £&, Dilberti v. U.S.. 817 F.2d 1259, 1263 (7th Cir. 1987) (affidavit 
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contradicting sworn statement in a military document rejected. "It is well established that a 
party cannot create a genuine issue of fact by submitting an affidavit containing conclusory 
allegations which contradict plain admissions in prior deposition or otherwise sworn 
testimony.") It does not matter that interrogatory answers are not subject to cross examination 
or that they are a sworn statement similar to an affidavit. What matters is that interrogatory 
answers are a discovery device used to pin down facts. Once an answer is made and relied 
upon in a summary judgment motion the opposing party should not be allowed to create a 
sham issue of fact by simply contradicting the prior answer. The reasoning preventing 
contradiction without explanation applies whether the original testimony is a deposition, 
interrogatory answer, a sworn statement in a police report or any other sworn method of setting 
forth a statement of fact. 
Encompassed within this question is the subsidiary question of whether the Court of 
Appeals wrongly decided that Jensen's affidavit submitted in opposition to summary judgment 
was not inconsistent with her interrogatory answers. Union Pacific submits that Jensen's 
subsequent affidavit which states she recalls not hearing the whistle is clearly contradictory 
of her earlier interrogatory answer that she remembered little or nothing of the accident. 
This is an important question for this Court to review because the Court of Appeals has 
established the principle that a party may not ask a general question in discovery, such as the 
question asked here as to how the accident happened to which Jensen responded "I remember 
nothing of the accident and very litde, if anything, of what happened prior to the accident" (R. 
218), but instead must ask numerous and exhaustive questions regarding every conceivable fact 
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of the case. For example, Union Pacific would have been required to ask: did the accident 
happen because you were preoccupied, did the accident happen because you didn't see the 
train, did the accident happen because you didn't hear the train, did the accident happen 
because you could not stop in time, did the accident happen because the street was wet, etc. 
Such specific questions would be never ending and might never get to the truth that a general, 
broad question would elicit. 
Such a process as the Court of Appeals implicitly requires, that of not being able to rely 
on answers to general questions, would be so unwieldy as to be unusable. In addition, 
summary judgments would be more difficult to bring because a party could escape prior 
answers by asserting that general answers in response to discovery do not preclude different 
answers in later filed affidavits as the general question was not specific enough. This Court 
should act to correct this situation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals has changed established precedent with regard to negative whistle 
testimony. The Court of Appeals has also ruled incorrectly on several legal questions which 
should be decided by this Court in accordance with related rulings. Union Pacific respectfully 
requests that this Court grant the petition for certiorari. 
DATED this 14th day of June, 1996. 
J^Ckre Williams 
Morris 0 Haggerty 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Alicia Jensen appeals the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Union Pacific Railroad, Inc. (Union 
Pacific). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
We review grants of summary judgment for correctness. See 
Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). "We 
do not defer to the trial court's conclusion that facts are 
undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported by those facts." 
Oquirrh Assocs. v. First Nat'1 Leasing Co.. 888 P.2d 659, 662 
(Utah App. 1994). Jensen raises three issues on appeal. We 
address each in turn. 
First, Jensen claims Union Pacific was negligent because 
event recorders show the train was traveling up to 1.3 miles per 
hour in excess of its maximum timetable speed of 50 miles per 
hour just minutes before the accident. Excessive speed of a 
train or other vehicle is the cause of an accident only when it 
prevents the driver from slowing down, stopping, or controlling 
the vehicle to avoid the collision, or when it misleads the 
driver of another vehicle. See Horsley v. Robinson. 112 Utah 
227, 239-41, 186 P.2d 592, 597-99 (1947); see also Dombeck v. 
Chicago. M.. St. P. & Pac. Ry.. 129 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Wis. 1964) 
(holding refusal to submit question of train's speed to jury 
correct because evidence could not support finding that excessive 
speed was causal). 
Jensen assumes that had the train been traveling one or two 
miles per hour slower, it could have stopped or slowed 
sufficiently to avoid the accident. "Trains cannot be stopped in 
time to avoid collisions if the time interval is shortened to a 
matter of . . . seconds." Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R.. 112 
Utah 189, 203-04, 186 P.2d 293, 301 (1947). Former Justice 
Crockett declared: 
It is contrary to the generally known laws of 
physics and common sense to expect the train, 
with its great weight and momentum, to stop 
within the short distance available after the 
instant it should have become apparent that 
[the plaintiff] was not going to stop. After 
that point was reached, there is nothing the 
crew could have done to avoid the collision. 
And this true whether the train was 
travelling fast or slow and whether the crew 
saw [the plaintiff] or not. 
Gregory v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.. 8 Utah 2d 114, 118, 329 
P.2d 407, 409 (1958) (Crockett, J., concurring). Thus, a train's 
speed generally cannot be the cause of crossing collisions as a 
matter of law. 
Further, in the present case, the train's speed was well 
within the federally mandated 60-miles-per-hour limit for the 
track in question. See 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) (1994). The train's 
speed was also within Union Pacific's timetable speed limit. 
Speed indicators on trains must be accurate within plus-or-minus 
5 miles per hour at speeds over 3 0 miles per hour. See 4 9 C.F.R. 
§ 229.117 (1994). Thus, the speed indicator's reading of 51.3 
miles per hour places the train within Union Pacific's timetable 
speed limit of 50 miles per hour. Jensen cannot prove negligence 
per se based simply on a reading of 1.3 miles per hour over the 
50-miles-per-hour maximum. Such a claim would have to be based 
on a reading in excess of 55 miles per hour. The trial court 
correctly determined Jensen's claim of negligent train speed must 
fail as a matter of law, and we affirm the trial court's ruling 
on that issue.1 
1. We do not address Union Pacific's contention that federal law 
preempts Jensen's claim of negligent train speed under CSX 
Transp.. Tnc. v. Easterwood. 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732 
(1993). Like the trial court, we conclude the train's speed 
could not have been a cause of the accident as a matter of law. 
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Second, Jensen asserts the crossing was more than ordinarily 
hazardous because a Utah Livestock Auction is held nearby on a 
weekly basis, creating traffic congestion and noise sufficient to 
obstruct the view of and muffle warning signals of on-coming 
trains. Liability of railroads for more-than-ordinarily-
hazardous crossings is limited to obstructions either created by 
the railroad or located on the railroad's right of way. See 
Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R.. 842 P.2d 832, 834 (Utah 1992); Gleave 
v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.. 749 P.2d 660, 663-64 (Utah App. 
1988) . Any obstructions making the instant crossing more than 
ordinarily hazardous were beyond the control of Union Pacific. 
Union Pacific did not create any obstruction at the crossing, and 
its right of way was free of obstructions. The trial court 
correctly determined Jensen could not establish liability for a 
more than ordinarily hazardous crossing as a matter of law, and 
we affirm the trial court's ruling on that issue. 
Third, Jensen contends Union Pacific is negligent because it 
failed to comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-
14 (1994). Utah law requires trains to sound warnings beginning 
one-quarter mile before every grade crossing. It is not 
necessary for plaintiffs to establish that witnesses were 
affirmatively listening for the warnings or "paying particular 
attention to the thing observed [or not observed]." Seybold v. 
Union Pac. R.R., 121 Utah 61, 66, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951). 
"'All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in 
relation to the train at the time it is claimed the warnings were 
given that said warnings would have awakened her attention to 
them."' Curtis v. Harmon Elecs.. Inc.. 575 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah 
1978) (quoting Hudson v. Union Pac. R.R.. 120 Utah 245, 251, 233 
P.2d 357, 360 (1951)). Additionally, whether a train sounded 
required warnings has been a factual question for juries to 
decide since before statehood. See, e.g., Smith v. Rio Grande W. 
Ry.. 9 Utah 141, 143, 33 P. 626, 627 (1893). 
In response to Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment, 
Jensen submitted an affidavit in which she stated she did not 
hear the train whistle. "' [I]t only takes one sworn statement 
under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the 
controversy and create an issue fact.*" Draper City v. Estate of 
Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995) (quoting Holbrook Co. 
v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975)). Nonmoving parties need 
not rebut affidavit evidence at the summary judgment stage of 
litigation, they need only controvert such statements and thus 
create a genuine issue of material fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). We also observe 
[w]hile generally positive testimony (such as 
I heard the whistle) is better than negative 
testimony (such as I did not hear the 
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whistle) the district court may not accept 
positive testimony to the exclusion of 
negative "estimony on a motion for summary 
judgment. It is a credibility question 
whether one witness' memory is more reliable 
than another witness* memory, and such 
credibility determinations are not to be made 
on a motion for summary judgment. 
Easterwood v. CSX Transp.. Inc., 933 F.2d 1548, 1560 n.14 (11th 
Cir. 1991), aff'd. 507 U.S. 658, 676, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1744 
(1993) (emphasis added). 
Union Pacific claims Jensen cannot rely on her affidavit to 
create an issue of fact because it contradicts her previous 
answers to interrogatories.2 However, Union Pacific's 
interrogatories did not specifically ask whether Jensen heard the 
whistle; thus, her affidavit does not contradict her prior sworn 
statements. Union Pacific also claims Jensen's affidavit did not 
include statements that she was paying sufficient attention to 
have heard the whistle had it been sounded. Despite the 
dissent's acceptance of this argument, we can find no Utah law 
requiring nonmoving parties to lay such an evidentiary foundation 
in an affidavit opposing summary judgment. Nonmoving parties 
need only controvert the moving party's assertions, thus creating 
a genuine issue of fact. Accordingly, the trial court 
incorrectly determined that no genuine issues of material fact 
existed on the question of whether tne train sounded warnings as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994), and we reverse the 
trial court's ruling on that issue. 
In sum, we affirm the trial court's rulings on the issues of 
the train's excessive speed and Union Pacific's liability for a 
more-than-ordinarily-hazardous crossing. We reverse the trial 
court's ruling on the question of whether Union Pacific complied 
2. The rule relating to affidavits that contradict prior sworn 
testimony grows from cases in which an affidavit contradicts an 
earlier deposition. Courts have reasoned that deposition 
testimony is more reliable than an affidavit because it is 
subject to cross examination. See, e.g., Webster v. Sill, 675 
P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). Such is not the case here. 
Answers to interrogatories, like affidavits, are sworn statements 
made without cross examination; one sworn statement is not more 
probative than another merely because it was made first. 
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with Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994) and remand the matter for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I CONCUR: 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part): 
I concur in the majority opinion's analysis regarding the 
speed of the train and whether the crossing was more than 
ordinarily hazardous. I respectfully dissent, however, from the 
majority's determination that there is a material issue of fact 
on the question of whether the defendant complied with Utah Code 
Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994) by sounding the required warnings. In my 
view, plaintiff did not adequately rebut defendant's evidence 
that such warnings were sounded. Caselaw in Utah and elsewhere 
regarding the probative value of negative testimony in similar 
cases holds that the witness must have been positioned so "it is 
reasonable to suppose he would have observed had it occurred or 
the fact existed." Seybold v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 
66, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951). See also, Curtis v. Harmon Elecs.. 
Inc.f 575 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah 1978) (noting that witness's 
testimony valueless when attention elsewhere); Hudson v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co.. 120 Utah 245, 251, 233 P.2d 357, 360 (1951) 
(noting that witness must be situated so that warnings would have 
"awakened her attention to them"); Bebout v. Norfolk & Western 
Ry. Co.. 982 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing 
Illinois rule that negative evidence is probative only if witness 
close enough to hear and is paying sufficient attention to have 
heard). 
Plaintiff's affidavit that she did not hear any warnings, 
and may have been playing a "wish" game at the time of the 
collision, is bereft of assertions she was paying sufficient 
attention to have heard the warnings if they were sounded. 
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Consequently, I would affirm the trial court's decision in its 
entirety. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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56-1-14. Procedures at grade crossings. 
Every locomotive shall be provided with a bell which shall be rung contin-
uously from a point not less than eighty rods from any city or town street or 
public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or public highway 
grade crossing shall be crossed, but, except in towns and at terminal points, the 
sounding of the locomotive whistle or siren at least one-fourth of a mile before 
reaching any such grade crossing shall be deemed equivalent to ringing the 
bell as aforesaid; during the prevalence of fogs, snow and dust storms, the 
locomotive whistle shall be sounded before each street crossing while passing 
through cities and towns. All locomotives with or without trains before crossing 
the main track at grade of any other railroad must come to a full stop at a 
distance not exceeding 400 feet from the crossing, and must not proceed until 
the way is known to be clear; two blasts of the whistle or two sounds of the 
siren shall be sounded at the moment of starting; provided, that whenever 
interlocking signal apparatus and derailing switches or any other crossing 
protective device approved by the Department of Transportation is adopted 
such stop shall not be required. 
Provided, that local authorities in their respective jurisdiction may by 
ordinance approved by the Department of Transportation provide more re-
stricted sounding of bells or whistles or sirens than is provided herein and may 
prescribe points different from those herein set forth at which such signals 
shall be given and may further restrict such ringing of bells or sounding of 
whistles or sirens so as to provide for either the ringing of a bell or the 
sounding of a whistle or of a siren or the elimination of the sounding of such 
bells or whistles or sirens or either of them, except in case of emergency. 
The term locomotive as used herein shall mean every self-propelled steam 
engine, electrically propelled interurban car and so-called diesel operated 
locomotive. 
Every person in charge of a locomotive violating the provisions of this section 
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and the railroad company shall be liable for all 
damages which any person may sustain by reason of such violation. 
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JUDGE BOYD L. PARK 
This matter came before the Court on April 17, 1995 for oral argument on 
defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. The Court, having received and reviewed the 
motion, memorandum in support, memorandum in opposition, reply memorandum, and 
supplemental reply memorandum; having heard oral arguments; and having reviewed the 
applicable law, now makes the following findings and conclusions: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Although plaintiff is a resident of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, defendant Union Pacific Railroad is a Utah corporation 
authorized to do business in the State of Utah and in Utah County, State of Utah. The 
accident which gave rise to this cause of action occurred in Utah County, State of Utah, and 
therefore jurisdiction and venue are properly vested in this Court. 
2. On February 5, 1994, the parties were involved in a collision between defendant's 
train and plaintiffs automobile. Plaintiff was a passenger in her automobile, which was 
crossing the railroad tracks at approximately 5950 South 650 West in Utah County when the 
automobile was struck by a train owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff alleges she 
suffered severe and permanent injuries as a direct and proximate result of this collision. 
3. On February 7, 1995 defendant filed with this Court a Motion For Summary 
Judgment and an accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
For Summary Judgment. On March 2, 1995 plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
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Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment and a Request for Hearing on Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. On March 15, 
1995 Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment was 
filed. On April 12, 1995 Defendant's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion For Summary Judgment was filed with the Court. Oral arguments on this motion 
were heard on April 17, 1995. 
4. The accident giving rise to this cause of action occurred at approximately 12:10 
p.m. on February 5, 1994 at a public railroad crossing of defendant's Provo Subdivision 
mainline trackage located near 650 West and 5950 South in Spanish Fork, Utah County. At 
the time of the accident, plaintiffs automobile was being driven by plaintiffs boyfriend, 
Bruce Brinkmeier, also a minor at the time of the accident. Brinkmeier was cited for driving 
without a license. The train in question was an empty coal train with three locomotives and 
46 trailing empty coal cars. The train weighed 1424 tons and was 2622 feet in length. 
5. According to the train's engineer, the train was traveling from Milford to Provo in 
a southwest to northeast direction. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, defendant's Memorandum 
in Support, Exhibit D. The trackage at that location is relatively straight and flat. See 
Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 5(e). 
Plaintiffs automobile was traveling southbound on 650 West. The road (650 West) is 
straight and flat for hundreds of feet before reaching the crossing. Id. The trackage and 
road intersect at an angle greater than 90 degrees with reference to the directions of approach 
of the train and car. Id. at ^ 5(a). 
6. The crossing is located in a rural farming area and is surrounded by open fields on 
the approach side. A Utah Livestock Auction building and animal pens are located in the 
southwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is on the opposite side of the tracks 
from which plaintiffs automobile approached. The northwest quadrant, which is the view 
quadrant for the approaching train and car, is an open field. See Affidavit of Lawrence 
Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B. At the time of the accident, a 
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livestock auction was taking place. There was a considerable amount of traffic, and trucks 
and trailers were parked near the crossing. 
7. An advance stop sign warning sign was posted alongside 650 West approximately 
572 feet north of the crossing. Also posted were an advance railroad crossing warning sign, 
an advance railroad crossing sign painted on the road, railroad crossing "crossbuck" signs, 
and a stop sign. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, 
Exhibit B. 
8. Defendant alleges that its engineer began sounding the locomotive whistle and bell 
approximately 1/4 mile away from the 5950 South crossing and continued to sound them up 
to the point of the accident at the 650 West crossing. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, ft 7-8, 
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. The distance between the 5950 South and 
650 West crossings is approximately 1,100 feet. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, 
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 5(b). 
9. At about the time the train passed over the 5950 South crossing, the engineer 
noticed a truck pulling a horse trailer begin to drive over the tracks in a southbound 
direction. Shortly after seeing the truck/horse trailer clear the crossing, the engineer noticed 
plaintiff's automobile rolling towards the crossing. The car was following a few seconds 
behind the truck/horse trailer and moving past the stop sign. The engineer placed the train in 
emergency braking immediately upon seeing the car. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, ^ 9-
11, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. 
10. The train was a few hundred feet from the crossing when the engineer first saw 
plaintiffs car approaching the intersection. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, f 10, defendant's 
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. It took the train approximately 1,400 feet to stop after 
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's 
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 5(g). The left side of the snowplow of the leading 
locomotive struck the right front portion of the car. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, 1 10, 
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's 
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Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 4(g)-(h). Both occupants were ejected from the car 
and thrown in the same northeasterly direction. Neither occupant was wearing a seatbelt. 
11. Defendant alleges that plaintiff and Brinkmeier played a "wish" game upon arrival 
at the crossing, lifting their feet from the floor of the car and looking for something metallic 
within the car to touch with their fingers while simultaneously making a wish and crossing 
the tracks. Plaintiff admits this, but asserts that she has no recollection of doing so just prior 
to the collision. The parties agree, for the purpose of the summary judgment motion, that 
plaintiff and Brinkmeier never saw or heard the train prior to impact. 
12. The parties agree that the "authorized speed limit" for the trackage in question was 
set by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) at 60 m.p.h. for freight trains and 80 
m.p.h. for passenger trains. However, defendant Union Pacific voluntarily filed with the 
FRA a lower "timetable" speed of only 50 m.p.h. for its freight trains. Plaintiff argues that 
it is this timetable speed that applies rather than the FRA's authorized speed limit of 60 
m.p.h. 
13. Defendant claims that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least 
the last three miles before the engineer initiated emergency braking. See Affidavit of Ryan 
Puffer, 1 5, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of George E. 
Ohisson, f 7, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. Plaintiff argues that the train 
was traveling an average speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the three minutes prior to the collision. 
See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews, f 8, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 2. 
14. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See U.R.C.P. 56; 
Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Furthermore, "[although summary judgment may on occasion be appropriate in negligence 
cases, it is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case." Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 
126, 126 (1987) (citing Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)). 
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15. Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment addresses three areas of analysis: 1) 
Union Pacific was not negligent in traveling in excess of the timetable speed limit; 2) Union 
Pacific did not fail to reduce the speed of its train through what plaintiff alleged to be a 
"more than ordinarily hazardous crossing"; and 3) Union Pacific complied with requirements 
of U.C.A. § 56-1-14, which governs the use of whistles and bells when approaching railroad 
crossings. The Court will analyze these issues individually. 
Authorized Speed Limit 
16. Although the FRA has set the speed limit for freight trains at 60 m.p.h., Union 
Pacific has voluntarily chosen to set a lower "timetable" speed limit of 50 m.p.h. for its 
freight trains, 10 m.p.h. below the speed limit mandated by the FRA. According to 
plaintiffs accident reconstructionist, the train was averaging a speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the 
three minutes prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews (Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2). At 
oral arguments, plaintiff presented a speed graph obtained from the train's recorder. That 
graph indicated variations in the train's speed prior to the accident, and recorded the train's 
speed as varying from 50 m.p.h. to as much as 52.5 m.p.h. 
17. Based on data retrieved from the train's Pulse Electronics "speed recorder" device 
which electronically recorded the train's speed on tape prior to the accident, defendant claims 
that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least the last three miles before 
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of George Ohlsson (defendant's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, 
Exhibit F); see also Pulse Electronic printout (defendant's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit A). In the Affidavit of 
George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific Railroad (see 
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F), Mr. Ohlsson stated the following: 
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It is difficult for even the most competent engineer to maintain a long and 
heavy train at a certain and undeviating speed. The curvature and 
undulation of the trackage will retard and increase the speed of a long and 
heavy train even though an engineer is holding a steady throttle on the 
locomotive. A train which travels for a number of miles at a speed which 
does not deviate more than one or two miles an hour is, in my 
professional opinion, going at a steady speed. It is simply not possible to 
control a train's speed any better than that. 
Id. at 1 8. 
18. Defendant argues that the FRA's "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h. for freight 
trains preempts plaintiff's claim of excessive speed. Defendant cites CSX Transportation, 
Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (1993) in support of its argument that plaintiffs claims 
of common law negligence are unfounded. In Easterwood, the plaintiff sued for the death of 
her husband resulting from a railroad crossing accident, alleging that CSX was negligent 
under Georgia law for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing and for 
operating the train at an excessive speed. The authorized speed limit for the track in 
Easterwood was set at 60 m.p.h. and, while conceding that the train was traveling at a speed 
under 60 m.p.h., Easterwood nevertheless claimed that CSX breached its common-law duty 
to operate its train at a moderate and safe rate of speed. 
19. The federal regulations involved in Easterwood had been issued by the Secretary of 
Transportation pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), which 
established an authorized speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. A clause of the FRSA 
permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law, rule, regulation, order, or standard 
relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary adopted a regulation covering the 
subject matter of such state requirement. The preemption clause of the FRSA (45 U.S.C.S. 
§ 434) confers on the Secretary of Transportation the power to preempt state common law. 
Given the Secretary's adoption of train-speed regulations pursuant to the FRSA (49 C.F.R. § 
213.9(a)), a state's common-law restrictions on train speed are not preserved by a saving 
clause in 45 U.S.C.S. § 434, under which a state may continue in force an additional or 
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more stringent law relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an 
essentially local safety hazard and when not incompatible with any federal law. Easterwood, 
113 S.Ct. at 1743 (1993). 
20. The Court in Easterwood found for CSX, who had argued that Easterwood's claim 
was preempted because the federal speed limits are regulations covering the subject matter of 
the common law of train speeds. The Court further stated that to hold otherwise would be to 
deprive the Secretary of the power to preempt state common law, a power clearly conferred 
by § 434. Therefore, the Court found that Easterwood's reliance on the common law was 
incompatible with both the FRSA and the Secretary's regulations. Id. at 1743. 
21. In the case now before this Court, defendant argues that its train was traveling well 
below the federally imposed speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. "The fact that the 
Union Pacific had set a lower 'timetable' speed limit than that specified by the FRA is 
irrelevant since any claim based upon a violation of the railroad set limit would be but a 
variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive or unreasonable speed." 
See Defendant's Memorandum in Support at 8, t 1. 
22. Plaintiff argues that, because defendant filed its timetable with the FRA pursuant to 
49 C.F.R. 217, the Court should consider that action as evidence that the maximum 
authorized speed at the intersection of the collision is 50 m.p.h. and that timetables filed with 
the FRA are therefore enforceable against the defendant, and train speeds in excess of those 
timetables violate federal law. See Affidavit of Bruce Reading (plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition, Exhibit 1). Furthermore, plaintiff claims that this case is distinguishable from 
Easterwood because there is no attempt to impose on Union Pacific a state-enforced speed 
regulation which is more stringent than its federal counterpart. Instead, plaintiff claims that 
defendant's train was exceeding its own maximum authorized timetable speed, thus violating 
federal law, and that defendant was therefore negligent. 
23. Given the ruling in Easterwood and the parties' arguments, the issue now before the 
Court is (a) whether Union Pacific's timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. for freight trains is a 
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variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive speed and thus preempted 
by federal law governing the "subject area," or (b) whether the FRSA covers speed limits 
self-imposed by Union Pacific and, if not, whether defendant was negligent in exceeding its 
speed limit for freight trains. 
24. The FRSA specifically permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law, 
rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary 
adopts a regulation covering the subject matter of such state requirement. This legislation 
was designed to prevent states from interfering with regulations established by the FRA. In 
this case, it is clear that the FRA had designated an "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h. 
for freight trains traveling along this stretch of track. However, the State of Utah has not 
attempted to impose a more stringent law, rule, or regulation regarding authorized train 
speed. Instead, Union Pacific has created its own timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. The Court 
finds the present case to be distinguishable from Easterwood, where the State of Georgia 
tried to impose law, rules, or regulations governing train speed. The Court in Easterwood 
did not explain how the FRSA addresses the question of timetable speeds which are a) self-
imposed by railroad companies and not by States; and b) lower than the federally authorized 
train speeds. 
25. In his affidavit, plaintiffs witness Bruce Reading alleges that, under federal law, 
each railroad company is required to file a copy of its Operating Rules and Timetables with 
the FRA, and concludes that the speed limits mandated in the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company Operating Rules and Timetables thus become the federally mandated guidelines and 
maximum speed limits for the railroad company and are enforceable by the FRA. See 
Affidavit of Bruce Reading, f 1 4-9, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 1. 
Accordingly, Union Pacific's self-imposed timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. would become its 
federally authorized speed and could not be preempted by the FRA. 
26. Defendant argues that 49 C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the 
federal speed limits set in 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 and that timetable filings therefore have no 
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effect on the maximum speeds at which a railroad may operate its trains. According to 
defendant, section 217 requires only the filing of operating rules and timetables, which may 
or may not contain speed limits, and does not require that speed limit changes be filed with 
the FRA. Defendant again turns to the Easterwood decision and argues that it is § 213.9 
which sets the "ceiling" or "maximum" speed, not timetables, and asserts that "[i]mplicit in 
such holding is the understanding that while a railroad may not exceed such limit, it may by 
internal fiat voluntarily operate its trains at any slower speed deemed appropriate." See 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support at 4. 
27. The Easterwood case does not provide any clear rule as to how one should address 
the issue of timetable speeds within 49 C.F.R. §§ 217 and 213.9. However, plaintiff has 
equally failed to provide any case law which would substantiate her claim that Union 
Pacific's timetable filing under § 217 has an effect on the maximum speed at which a 
railroad may operate its train under § 213.9. Defendant has provided the Court with the 
recent case of Southern Pacific Tramp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Oregon, 9 F.3d 807 
(9th Cir. 1993), which supports defendant's argument that the FRA, by requiring Union 
Pacific to file its timetable speed limits, does not thereby adopt that timetable limit as a 
federal law enforceable against the railroad and preemptive of the speed limits set forth in 49 
C.F.R. §213.9. In Southern Pacific, an Oregon law permitted local authorities to ban the 
sounding of locomotive whistles under certain conditions. Southern Pacific Transportation 
Company argued that the state law was preempted by three federal statutes and moved for 
summary judgment. The state of Oregon made a cross-motion for summary judgment, 
claiming that its regulations were not preempted as a matter of law. Following the Supreme 
Court's decision in Easterwood, the circuit court held that the state law and regulations were 
not preempted by any of the three federal statutes cited by Southern Pacific and affirmed the 
district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the State of Oregon. 
28. In addressing Southern Pacific's claim that the Oregon statute was also preempted 
by 45 C.F.R. § 217, which requires railroads to keep their operating rules on file with the 
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FRA, the circuit court stated that ff[b]ecause the FRA neither approves nor adopts the 
railroad's rules in any manner, the rules do not have the force of law and therefore cannot 
preempt the Oregon statute." Southern Pacific, 9.F3d at 812 n.5. This statement is equally 
applicable in the case now before this Court, in that it supports defendant's argument that 49 
C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the federal speed limits set in 49 
C.F.R. § 213.9. The railroad's rules and timetable filings submitted to the FRA in 
accordance with section 217 are not approved or adopted by the FRA and therefore do not 
have the force of law. 
29. Even if defendant were bound by its timetable speed of 50 m.p.h., there still 
remain the questions of (a) whether Union Pacific was negligent in exceeding that speed, and 
(b) if the train's speed was a proximate cause of the collision. 
30. The train's speed in this matter was not a causal factor unless the train could have 
stopped, prior to collision, from the point at which plaintiff first saw the danger. The Court 
agrees with the holding in Dombeck v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 129 
N.W.2d 185 (Wise. 1964). In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that, even 
under an assumption that the train's speed was negligent, such speed as a matter of law could 
not be causal: 
In order to be causal the train's speed must either have misled . . . the 
driver of the car or it must have interfered with the control and 
management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such 
control and management would have otherwise been effective to have 
avoided the collision. 
Id. at 192. As to the first prong of this test, whether Brinkmeier, as driver, or plaintiff, as 
passenger, were misled as to the speed of the train, plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she 
did not see the train prior to the collision, nor did she hear the train blow its whistle or 
sound its horn prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, \\ 7-8, Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3. In his recorded statement, Mr. Brinkmeier also 
stated that he did not hear the train or its horn. See the recorded statement of Bruce 
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Brinkmeier at 15, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. The Court finds that, 
because both plaintiff and Brinkmeier admit that they were not looking or listening for a 
train, and because both stated that they never saw or heard the train prior to impact, neither 
could have been misled as to the speed of the train in estimating its time of arrival at the 
crossing. As to the second prong of this test, whether the train's speed interfered with the 
control and management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such control 
and management would have otherwise been effective to have avoided the collision, the 
Court finds that plaintiff has made no argument or produced any evidence that the train could 
have been stopped or sufficiently slowed to have allowed plaintiff's automobile to safely 
cross the tracks if the train had indeed been traveling 50 m.p.h. at the time the engineer 
activated the emergency brakes. Defendant, however, provided the Court with the Affidavit 
of Ryan Puffer, the engineer. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. In his 
affidavit, Engineer Puffer stated that he placed the train into emergency braking as soon as 
he saw plaintiffs automobile, because it was his impression that the car was not going to 
stop and was going to come onto the track directly in front of the train. He further stated 
that "[a] long heavy train takes a number of seconds, after placing it into emergency braking, 
before it even begins to slow down. On this occasion the train did not even begin to slow 
down before the accident happened." Id. at 1 11. In addition, defendant provided the Court 
with the affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific 
Railroad Company. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. In his affidavit, 
Mr. Ohlsson stated that the small difference between the 50 m.p.h. timetable speed and an 
actual speed of approximately 51 m.p.h. "would not have made any significant difference in 
terms of how far the train would have gone before slowing down or stopping after the brakes 
were applied. A matter of 1 m.p.h. is, in my opinion, insignificant in terms of stopping time 
and distance." Id. at f 10. 
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31. For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the train had been traveling one or 
two miles above the timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h., the train's speed was not a 
proximate cause of the accident. 
Dangerous Crossing 
32. According to the Utah Supreme court in English v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 P.47 
(1896), a crossing that is "more than ordinarily hazardous" places an additional duty of care 
on the railroad. Plaintiff argues that several conditions existed at the time of the accident 
which created a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. These conditions include (a) an 
auction barn near the tracks accompanied by the busy nature of a livestock auction; and (b) 
trucks and trailers parked near the crossing which may have impeded vision or caused 
plaintiff to not hear the train as it approached. According to plaintiff, the accident occurred 
during a time when the commotion and noise of a livestock auction rendered the nearby 
crossing "more than ordinarily hazardous." 
33. More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals applied the English standard of "more 
than ordinarily hazardous" in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 
660 (Utah App. 1988). In Gleave, the plaintiff was hit by an empty coal train at a crossing 
in Springville, Utah. The court instructed the jury that "UDOT was statutorily given 
ultimate responsibility for crossing design and warning and safety devices and that, 
accordingly, [the jury] could not find Rio Grande negligent 'based upon any defects which 
might exist with respect to the design of the 1600 South crossing or based upon any problems 
you may perceive in the lack of traffic warning devices' there." Id. at 663. The jury found 
the crossing to be more than ordinarily hazardous and then further found that Rio Grande 
failed to exercise reasonable care in driving the train across the roadway "given the 
crossing's design, its physical characteristics, and the existing warning signs." Id. at 664. 
The conditions that contributed to this "hazardous" crossing in Gleave included a dangerous 
crossing angle, a mound of earth, and a curving track. 
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34. In Duncan v. Union Pacific R.R., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), a car containing a 
driver and three passengers was struck by a freight train in Tooele County on Droubay Road. 
While the road intersected the track at 43 degrees on the north and 136 degrees on the south, 
nothing obstructed the motorist's view of the tracks for several thousand feet. The Utah 
Supreme court in Duncan affirmed the trial court's finding that the "crossing was not 'more 
than ordinarily hazardous' because plaintiffs could not demonstrate, or even suggest, what 
more Union Pacific could have done to make this crossing safer, short of installing automatic 
warning lights and signs and gates, which admittedly was not its responsibility." Id. at 833. 
However, the Duncan court did reiterate the criteria used in the English case to determine 
whether a crossing would be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous: 
[A] crossing might be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous if it was 
in a thickly populated portion of a city; if the view of the tracks was 
obstructed because of the railroad itself or natural objects; if the crossing 
was frequented by heavy traffic so that approaching trains could not be 
heard; or if, for any reason, devices employed at the crossing were 
rendered inadequate to warn the public of the danger of an approaching 
train. 
Id. at 834 (quoting English, 13 Utah at 419-20, 45 P. at 50 (1896)). 
35. In light of the criteria set forth in English and reiterated in Duncan, the plaintiff in 
this case now argues that conditions present at the time of the accident, namely the auction 
barn and the traffic and commotion which accompany a livestock auction, meet the criteria of 
a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. Plaintiff further argues that a factfinder should 
therefore be allowed to determine if the crossing was hazardous and, if so, whether 
defendant exercised reasonable care when driving the train across this particular railroad 
crossing. 
36. While not agreeing that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous, defendant 
argues that, assuming arguendo, "such a scenario does not impose a duty upon Union Pacific 
to reduce the train's speed below the federally mandated limit." See defendant's 
Memorandum in Support at 9, ^ 1. Defendant argues that the plaintiff in Easterwood also 
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alleged unsafe crossing conditions requiring additional warning devices. However, despite 
the Easterwood court's finding that plaintiff may have had a viable claim for an unsafe 
crossing, the Court found that the railroad had no duty to reduce the train's speed below the 
federal limit. Defendant argues that its train was traveling 10 m.p.h. below the federal limit 
and that because the FRA sets train speeds with crossing safety concerns already in mind, 
plaintiffs allegation of defendant's failure to reduce the speed of its train through the "more 
than ordinarily hazardous" crossing is unfounded. 
37. Defendant further argues that, when a crossing is deemed to be extrahazardous, a 
railroad's duty of care is limited to those unsafe conditions which it created or over which it 
has responsibility. See defendant's Reply Memorandum at 13. Defendant cites Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Duncan v. 
Union Pacific R. Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1990), in alleging that a railroad's duty of care 
extends only to obstructions to view or sound caused by the railroad or located on railroad 
right of way or property. Defendant then cites Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19, which places a 
duty of care on property owners to remove vegetation or other obstructions on their property 
which constitute a traffic hazard by obstructing the view of any motor vehicle operator, and 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14 et seq., which delegates to the Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT) the responsibility for regulating the safe travel of motorists on roads and highways, 
including those which pass over and across railroad tracks. 
38. This Court finds that, even if a jury could determine the existence of conditions that 
would make the accident site a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing, those conditions 
were not the responsibility of defendant. The noise around the auction was not something 
within defendant's control. The fact that there were "No Parking" signs posted around the 
area following the accident to prevent parked cars from obstructing drivers' views of the 
railroad track does not imply any lack of care on defendant's part prior to the accident, since 
such precautions are not the defendant's responsibility. 
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39. For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the railroad crossing was a "more 
than ordinarily hazardous" crossing when a livestock auction was in progress, any unusually 
hazardous conditions resulting from the auction were not defendant's responsibility. 
U.C.A § 56-1-14 (Locomotive Bells & Whistles) 
40. Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 governs the operation of locomotive whistle and bell 
devices at public railroad crossings. It provides as follows: 
Every locomotive shall be provided with a bell which shall be rung 
continuously from a point not less than than 80 rods from any city or town 
street or public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or 
public highway grade shall be crossed, but, except in towns and at 
terminal points, the sounding of the locomotive whistle or siren at least 
1/4 of a mile before reaching any such grade crossing shall be deemed 
equivalent to ringing the bell as aforesaid. . . 
Id. According to defendant, where the grade crossing is in a rural area such as the one in 
question, the requirement is that either the bell or the whisde must be operated beginning "at 
least" 1320 feet from the crossing. Defendant argues that Engineer Puffer sounded both the 
bell and the whistle approximately 1/4 of a mile from the crossing, well in excess of the 
statutorily required distance of 1320 feet. 
41. Plaintiff argues that neither the driver nor the passenger of the car ever heard the 
train's whistle or bells prior to the accident. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3, and the recorded statement of Bruce Brinkmeier, 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. Plaintiff alleges that the Pulse Electronics 
graph, attached to the Affidavit of Bruce Reading, indicates that no whistles or bells were 
sounded by the train as it approached the crossing. Plaintiff points to the statements of 
several witnesses who were near the crossing at die time of the accident. In their voluntary 
statements to police, Gerald and Whitney Hill made no mention of the train's whistle or bells 
at the time of the accident. Other witnesses also made voluntary statements to police and 
said nothing about hearing the train's whistle or bells at the time of the accident. However, 
Memorandum Decision 940400280 AT-
plaintiff has not provided the Court with any such statements in affidavit form, as required 
by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
42. The failure of the Pulse Electronics graph to record the whistle or bells of the train 
prior to the accident is explained by George E. Ohlsson in his Supplemental Affidavit. Mr. 
Ohlsson stated that the event recorder device installed on the locomotive used only 8-track 
cassettes, which do not have sufficient channels to record everything relative to the operation 
of the train; specifically, the 8-track cassette does not have a channel for showing whether 
the horn or whistle was being sounded. See Supplemental Affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, \ 
2. Mr. Ohlsson further stated that Union Pacific is beginning to replace the 8-track cassette 
event recorders with solid state event recorders which are capable of recording the sounding 
of a train's whistle. Id. at t 4. Furthermore, there is testimony in the police record to 
support defendant's claim that the train did sound its whistle and bells at some point before 
reaching the crossing, and that there were witnesses to the accident who did hear the train's 
wnistle and bells. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit A (Voluntary 
Statements of Johnny Starks and Robert Craw). Ryan Puffer, engineer of the train, stated 
that he began sounding the whistle and the bells approximately 1/4 mile away from the 
crossing at 5950 South, and then continued operating the bells and whistle from 5950 South 
for another 1100 feet until the train reached the crossing at 650 West where the accident 
occurred. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit C. 
43. The Court finds that, despite plaintiffs reference to the voluntary statements of 
witnesses who said nothing about having heard the train's bells or whistle, plaintiff did not 
submit any affidavits to that effect in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that 
those witnesses were in a position to hear the bells and whistles if they had in fact been 
sounded. Conversely, defendant submitted the affidavit of the train's engineer, Ryan Puffer, 
who stated that he checked the train prior to leaving Milford to verify that the brakes, 
whistle, and headlights worked properly. Mr. Puffer also stated that he sounded the train's 
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bells and whistles for over 1/4 of a mile prior to reaching the crossing at 5950 South, and 
continued to sound the whistle beyond that crossing because he knew there was another 
crossing (the 650 West crossing) shortly beyond the 5950 South crossing. Finally, Mr. 
Puffer stated that he was sounding the whistle continuously as he watched the truck and horse 
trailer cross the tracks just ahead of plaintiffs automobile. 
44. The Court finds the affidavit evidence presented is uncontradicted and that 
defendant did appropriately sound the train's bells and whistle as warning. 
Conclusion 
45. The Court concludes (a) that the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate 
cause of the accident; (b) that defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may 
have been present at the time of the accident and creating a "more than ordinarily hazardous" 
crossing; and (c) that defendant did sound the train's bells and whistle as it approached the 
crossing. Therefore, the Court finds no genuine issues of material fact remain as to 
defendant's liability to plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court grants defendant's Motion For 
Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an order 
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to 
form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 15th day of May, 1995. 
BY-THETSOURT: 
JUDCffe BOYD L. PARK 
cc: J. Clare Williams 
Allen Young 
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J. CLARE WILLIAMS, #3490 
MORRIS 0 HAGGERTY, #5283 
Attorneys for Defendant 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
406 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1151 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALECIA JENSEN, ) 
) ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD ) 
COMPANY ) Civil No. 940400280 
Defendant. ) Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing by the Court on April 17, 1995; with defendant being represented by I Clare Williams 
and plaintiff, who was present in the courtroom, being represented by Allen K. Young; and with 
the parties having filed written briefs and exhibits and having argued their respective positions to 
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now rules as follows: 
The Court finds and concludes: 
(1) That the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate cause of the 
accident; 
(2) That defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may have 
been present at the time of the accident and created a "more than ordinarily hazardous" 
crossing; and 
(3) That defendant did sound the train's bell and whistle as it approached the 
crossing. 
Therefore, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact to prevent 
it from acting on defendant's motion as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
orders plaintiffs Complaint dismissed w t^h prejudice, with each party to pay its own costs and 
expenses. 
DATED this ty day of June, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
BOYDYPARK 
Approved as to form this day 
of , 1995. 
Allen K. Young 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
